



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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UN Goals Must Be Made Clear

by Ernest A. Gross

When the United Nations Security Council was blocked by Soviet veto from taking a decision to expand the UN Observation Group in Lebanon, warnings were voiced on the air and in the press throughout the United States that the UN was "facing its decisive test." There is little room to doubt the gravity and complexity of the issues involved in our intervention in Lebanon and that of the British in Jordan. Nor can one minimize the consequences of Moscow's obstruction of the UN by persistent abuse of its procedures.

Yet surely it is a confusion of disease with symptom to say that the UN, rather than the policies of its members, is being tested. Moreover, it is ironic that many warnings that the organization itself is on trial come from those who have loudly insisted that, even as a voluntary assemblage of independent states, the UN infringes upon national sovereignty and, indeed, in the words of Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio, has an "insatiable lust for power."

Unless we start from the premise that the United Nations is, in fact, no superstate and that the United States would not have joined if it were, we flee from reality when we attack the UN for not acting like one. Such escapism

undermines our own national interest by deflecting public attention from the actual need, which is to strengthen the organization as a more effective instrument for free world diplomacy. It seems obvious that this can only be accomplished if member states pursue policies which, in their nature, tend to unify and invigorate a free coalition.

The United Nations Charter is an agenda for civilization. And the UN machinery is a tool well-fashioned for carrying out the agenda. But we have not grown up to our responsibilities if we persist in regarding the UN as an abstraction, a kind of self-executing millennium. The mechanism can be employed by a coalition of freedom; it cannot create such a coalition.

What, then, needs to be done to take greater advantage of the potentials offered for international cooperation through the UN? The basic "agenda items" of highest priority to the restless societies of mankind are in the economic, social and human rights fields. It is natural for the United States, with its own high standards of living, to regard the UN primarily as a forum for settling political disputes and for mobilizing sentiment against the interna-

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tional Communist conspiracy. Yet it is precisely because of this understandable preoccupation that we tend to lose sight of some stark realities.

One of these is that political instability often arises out of economic and social ferment. As the Middle East crisis confirms, the UN Charter is sound in stating that conditions of well-being are essential for friendly relations among states. Hence, when we deal with successive political crises as if they were mere by-products of political instability, we fail to meet the real issues. We may put out the fire, but do not clear the slum.

Secondly, and closely related, is our tendency to downgrade communism without upgrading democracy, giving the latter its broadest interpretation: free institutions founded on social justice. Anticommunism is thin soup to the hungry multitudes who are more fearful of starvation than they are of aggression—direct or indirect.

Need to Use UN

There seems little but outmoded prejudice and misguided fear to account for the fact that we have, as a nation, channeled so little of our generous foreign-aid programs through the United Nations. Our unilateral programs, which account for some 99 percent of our mutual security budget, are not in fact the most sensible way to assure a dollar's return for each of the American taxpayer's dollars spent on foreign aid. Much of the value of the currency is debased by inevitable suspicion of our motives as a donor. Moreover,

doubts are increased by our tendency to deal with economic assistance as a mere adjunct to our military defense program, so that in many parts of the world our aid is pictured as riding astride a tank rather than a tractor. Increased use of the UN would help to erase this image, without concealing the fact that the United States remains the principal contributor.

Support of Human Rights

In addition to strengthening the UN by bolstering its economic foundations, we should also repair the damage done by our neglect of the UN Human Rights programs. Without strong American leadership in this field, our influence is diminishing among the large populations who watch Little Rock with as much concern as Cape Canaveral.

Ten years ago, we led the General Assembly, over Soviet objection, in a fight for the Genocide Convention which outlaws the murder of ethnic or religious groups. Yet we have not ratified it, although the U.S.S.R. has. As a result, our voice sounded hollow in 1956 when we supported a UN resolution invoking the Genocide Convention against Soviet mass deportations from Hungary.

Several years ago we announced withdrawal of support of the Covenant on Human Rights, an action described by the chairman of the Human Rights Commission as a "bombshell." Later, we opposed for some time an antislavery treaty on the ground that it dealt with subjects within "the area of domestic jurisdiction." The Bricker Amend-

ment has been buried, but "its soul goes marching on."

Finally, the UN serves as a quite accurate meter with which to gauge the state of the coalition of freedom. A democratic society flourishes only to the extent that it is capable of disciplining itself. And all human experience proves that a capacity for self-discipline depends on an informed public opinion and on confidence in well-defined objectives. This applies at home as well as abroad, since it is impossible for a democratic government to reserve candor for the domestic market and administer double-talk beyond the water's edge. Only if public opinion at home and abroad is informed about the objectives of the United States can the international coalition of freedom be kept afloat.

Accordingly, the UN should be used as a forum for informing public opinion as to our policies and our purposes. If we are sound in both, we will gain adherents. As General George C. Marshall once said: "Majorities quickly form in support of the Charter principles." But this does not happen through automation. Principles must be candidly expounded and consistently applied. Otherwise, they are mere abstractions, to which neither men nor nations rally.

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Policy-Making in Washington

In charting American foreign policy the State and Defense departments, more often than is widely realized, take opposite approaches. The fighting forces advocate one position; the negotiating forces, the opposite.

This often makes policy-making sound very confusing and suggests that one government department is more patriotic than another. But that is not the case. Each is arguing its view within the framework of its responsibilities. And responsibilities are different in each case.

The military are charged with building a fighting force and producing a family of weapons that can defeat any enemy—in little wars or large wars, on the defensive or on the offensive. When the Pentagon advocates a policy it is within the framework of that charge.

The military consider only the ponderables; but the diplomats must consider the imponderables. The Defense Department must weigh and measure comparative military strength; the State Department must evaluate the moral, prestige and ideological factors involved. This makes the task of the military more of a science; that of the diplomat, more of an art.

All of this has been emphasized of late. For twice, recently, the State Department and the Pentagon have differed basically on major foreign policy matters. And in both cases Dwight D. Eisenhower's decision favored the State Department's position.

In other words, the President accepted the thesis that the imponderables should carry more weight than the ponderables in reaching a decision. It is not that he believes the judgment of Secretary John Foster

Dulles is sounder than that of Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy—although it is possible he may. It is rather that after weighing the military estimate presented by Secretary McElroy, the President superimposes on it the diplomatic or political estimate of Secretary Dulles.

Policy Differences

The first case in point relates to the United States offer conditionally to ban nuclear-weapons testing. Both the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission opposed such a ban. They argued that to develop and refine nuclear weapons, to make cleaner bombs possible, it was necessary to go on testing. And they further argued that the United States needed not only a wider range of nuclear weapons but more sophisticated weapons—such things as anti-missile missiles, IRBM's to defend Europe, ICBM's to defend America. Any ban on testing, they said, would hamper work on nuclear weapons.

But Secretary Dulles urged such a provisional ban on the President for political, not military, reasons. He pointed out that the scientists on both sides of the Iron Curtain had agreed that policing a ban was technically possible. And he pointed to the almost universal demand of the peoples in the world for an end to testing. The power of world opinion, buttressed by the findings of the scientists, plus the real prospect that this might be the first step toward disarmament, in the end outweighed the military arguments. And so the President came out in favor of a tentative nuclear-weapons test ban.

The second recent case in point involves the United States policy to-

ward the Nationalist-held islands off the coast of Communist China. Here Defense Department officials, considering only the military value of these small islands so near to the mainland, decided they were strategically insignificant and could be given up without hurting either Formosa's defense or America's security. They and Secretary Dulles and the President agree that Formosa must be included in America's defense perimeter.

But it is Secretary Dulles who now regularly warns Peiping that the United States sees these offshore islands closely linked to Formosa's defense and might have to defend them. He may not believe, any more than the Defense leaders, that they have a military significance; but he is unquestionably convinced that they have large political significance. However, the factors that have so persuaded him are not the same as in the case of a nuclear-weapons test ban. Here world opinion is unquestionably on the side of the United States military—evacuate the islands. Dulles believes that such a concession would lead not to any larger agreement with Peiping, but rather to increased demands and arrogance from the Chinese Communists. What he does foresee is our loss of face throughout Asia, possible collapse of Nationalist Chinese morale, more retreats before Communist pressure.

But it is significant that in both of these instances the President, after weighing the arguments of both Defense Department and State Department, ruled in favor of the latter. He was impressed with the art of diplomacy rather than with the science of warfare.

NEAL STANFORD



The IAEA Looks to New Role

VIENNA—Nowhere in the world more than in Vienna was the news received with such enthusiasm that the East-West conference of atomic scientists, meeting in Geneva from July 1 to August 23, had reached an agreement about an international system of controlling atomic explosions.

For Vienna is the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established on October 26, 1956. And the announcement that the atomic scientists of eight nations—United States, Britain, France, Canada, U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania—had agreed on methods to detect and check nuclear explosions aroused hope that the IAEA might be selected as the organization best qualified to implement the Geneva conclusions. The subsequent proposal made by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on August 22—in which the United States was joined by Britain—for a conditional one-year suspension of nuclear-weapons tests, beginning October 31, strengthened the hope of the IAEA experts that, despite rumors of war from the Middle East to the Formosa Strait, a new era had dawned for the atomic age.

In effect, when one recalls that as recently as this past year American officials had expressed strong doubts about the possibility of detecting nuclear explosions, and Moscow had opposed inspection, the conclusions reached by scientists of East and West represent a dramatic milestone in the world-wide controversy about the impact of nuclear fission on the lives of all human beings and on relations between nations. According to the Geneva communiqué, methods of detection now available, together

with the establishment of 180 inspection posts around the globe manned by 6,000 inspectors, would permit, within clearly determined limits, the detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

Such a control system, if established, would eliminate the danger, hitherto greatly feared in the United States, that the U.S.S.R., even though it should sign an agreement on suspension of nuclear tests, might waltz on its promise and secretly proceed with explosions. It clears the way for an agreement by the only three countries now capable of producing atomic bombs—the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Britain—on test suspension, which ultimately could facilitate the reduction of conventional, nonnuclear, weapons and give a new impetus to the output of atomic energy for peaceful uses. Meanwhile, the conference's proposal that inspection posts should be set up in Communist China may raise in a new form the question of Peiping's admission to the UN.

'Atoms for Peace'

The new perspectives opened to mankind this eventful summer will, it is hoped here, give fresh importance to the work of the IAEA. Its statute, adopted in 1956 by a conference at the United Nations headquarters in New York, at which 81 countries were represented, defined its objectives as follows: "The agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in

such a way as to further any military purpose."

The guiding principle of the IAEA is "atoms for peace," the phrase used by President Eisenhower in his appeal to the UN in December 1953 for the creation of such an agency. By its terms of reference the agency is obliged to make sure that all activities in which it takes part are exclusively directed to civilian uses. To do so, it must establish its own inspection and safeguarding system. It can be readily seen that this work might in itself prove of value in connection with the Geneva conclusions. And from the point of view of the IAEA it would seem superfluous to establish a new agency to implement these conclusions when its facilities, still in process of development, could be made available for this purpose.

In his 1953 address President Eisenhower, referring to the technically highly developed countries, expressed the hope that they "would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind." And the "atoms-for-peace" resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 4, 1954, declared that the IAEA should be established "without delay" in order to assist "in lifting the burdens of hunger, poverty and disease."

What IAEA Does

Hitherto, the IAEA has been engaged in three main tasks: (1) aid to underdeveloped countries in acquiring the necessary skills and materials so that their peoples can share in the benefits promised by the atomic age; (2) elaboration of health and safety

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The Sahara: Promise or Mirage?

by Virginia Thompson

Dr. Thompson, who has traveled extensively in French West Africa and the Sahara, is the author of many articles and books on world affairs and the coauthor of *French West Africa* (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1958).

Many of the 2,000 or more European technicians who have gone to the French Sahara during the past six years were astonished to discover that the desert is not a great void. Sand dunes cover only a small portion of its surface; some of its mountains rise to 10,000 feet; and one can die as readily from pneumonia and drowning in flash floods as from thirst because of the total lack of water.

Arid Land

The French Sahara, which covers more than twice the area of the United States, stretches from the Atlas Mountains of North Africa to the savanna areas of French West and French Equatorial Africa. Lesser portions of the Sahara lie in Spanish and Moroccan territory to the west and in Tunisia, Libya and Sudan to the east. Aridity—annual average rainfall is less than 8 inches—is the dominant physical feature of the portion of the Sahara that lies in Algeria, which overshadows all its other characteristics—a meager population (about 1 million), great distances (over 1.6 million square miles) and extremes of temperature (ranging from 133° above to 11° below zero Fahrenheit.)

The absence of permanent surface water has conditioned the social and economic structures found in the desert today, although recent archaeological discoveries have revealed the prehistoric existence of flourishing and populous negroid communities in regions now considered unfit for human habitation. As the Sahara be-

came desiccated, life could be maintained only through the development of camel husbandry and slavery, the two pillars of nomadic and sedentary society respectively.

It was thanks to the camel, probably introduced during the late Roman Empire, that the Berbers, the desert's first white nomads, were able to move southward as far as the banks of the Senegal and Niger rivers. By 700 A.D. the Arabs, who penetrated the desert during the preceding half century, had broken Berber resistance, and the Sahara lay open to the rule of successive Arab dynasties and invaders.

Isolation Lessened

Although the Arabs brought neither the camel nor the date palm into the Sahara, they did lessen its peoples' isolation from world contacts by bringing in thousands of Negro slaves, who became indispensable for the production of food crops, and by propagating Islam, which permeated the desert populations and the Negroes living along its southern rim. Slavery alone made agriculture possible in the oases, through the building and upkeep of immense and elaborate irrigation systems, and herding in the nomad camps. To some extent the harshness of the master-slave relationship was mitigated by extensive crossbreeding and by mutual need.

This feudal tie and socio-economic equilibrium—based more on occupational than ethnic differences—was upset by the French occupation, which began in 1844 at Biskra and

was not completed till the capture of Tindouf 24 years ago. During those years slavery was abolished, intertribal warfare and raiding eliminated, artesian wells sunk, health measures inaugurated and motor transport introduced. All these developments favored the sedentaries rather than the nomads, yet only in the date-exporting regions was the former's living standard appreciably bettered. Undernourished and malaria-ridden, the oasis Negro still owed four-fifths of his crop to the nomad overlord.

Poverty Persists

Such improvements in agriculture and other spheres that the French introduced were largely nullified by the parasitic grip of the nomads and the growth in the Saharan population. The real revolution for the sedentaries was the development of motor transport during the interwar period, which enabled the surplus oasis population for the first time to escape from their servitude. Many went to swell the urban proletariat in the cities of the coast, and there was a sharp decline in the number of Saharan farmers and herders. During the past 20 years date exports have fallen by half; many oases can now feed their residents for only two months of the year; and the French government must subsidize the heavy annual deficits.

As to the nomads, their situation, too—though it differs from one extreme of the Sahara to the other—has radically altered. Everywhere, however, a *pax gallica* put an end to

their lucrative armed raids, the advent of motor vehicles cut deeply into their caravan activities, and the progressive freeing of their slaves deprived them of the unpaid labor of herders and domestic servants. Some, like the Arab Chaanba, joined the French camel corps which policed the desert, or found temporary jobs in road building or coal mining. But to the great nomad tribes like the Reguëibat of Mauritania, the Touareg of Hoggar and the Toubou of Tibesti farming was menial, and the only worthy occupations remained those of the camel breeder, warrior and trader. In the south the nomads became comparatively prosperous, for the salt-caravan trade was still profitable, and increasingly they hired out their expanding herds for transport service or sold their animals for millet and manufactured goods in the Negro savanna regions. But in the north successive droughts from 1944 to 1947 decimated the herds disastrously and were the main cause of the mass sedentarization of nomads in that region.

Attitudes Change

Thus the Sahara was already in the throes of change and disintegration when the discovery of its extensive mineral wealth in the 1950's, together with the outbreak of strife in North Africa, accelerated the process and also brought in new elements. The most important of these was a radically altered attitude toward the Sahara on the part of both the French and Arab nationalists. So long as the Sahara remained a costly and unprofitable dependency France did not try to transform it nor did other peoples dispute its ownership. European colonization was obviously impossible in the desert which, moreover, did not then have enough resources even to pay for its pacification and administration.

Because of the Sahara's strategic location linking France's possessions to the north and to the south, effective control was left in the hands of the army, while its administration was divided among the adjacent French territories of Morocco and Tunisia (now independent), and Algeria, West and Equatorial Africa, according to lines drawn arbitrarily on the map. Four north-south motorable tracks crossed the desert, but the long-discussed trans-Sahara railroad never materialized, and there was virtually no economic development. At the time the International Geological Congress was held in Algiers in 1952, industrial mining was confined to two places—the Colomb-Béchar area for coal and the Gafsa region for phosphates. But already new mining techniques and equipment and, above all, the growth in truck and plane transport were for the first time making possible a scientific and detailed exploration of the desert.

Without awaiting its results, a few farsighted Frenchmen (led by Emile Belime and Erik Labonne) proposed creating a new political unit for the Saharan regions to be controlled directly from Paris and an industrial zone (*combinat*) around Colomb-Béchar. But opposition to "nationalizing" the Sahara proved strong from those who feared further damage of the desert's socio-economic structure and those who had a vested interest in the *status quo*, particularly officials and nationalists in Algeria. This project lapsed until 1956, when it was revived in a very different form.

Discovery of Oil

This was the Organisation Commune pour les Régions Sahariennes (O CRS), which at its debut on January 10, 1957 was assigned the task of stimulating and coordinating

the economic development of the Sahara, primarily in the interests of its inhabitants. This essentially economic organization would leave political control as before—albeit over a shrunken area, for in the interval Morocco and Tunisia had become independent states. The *combinat* project also faded, but this was because of mounting insecurity in that region and the hundreds of kilometers that separated Colomb-Béchar from the two most promising mineral finds—manganese at Guettara and iron at Tindouf. But what really transformed the whole Saharan picture was the discovery of sizable deposits of natural gas and petroleum in 1956.

New Interest in Sahara

With each new oil strike and the progressive unveiling of the Sahara's mineral wealth, the interest of France and other countries in that desert had sharpened, particularly during the Middle Eastern crises. Since January 11, 1958, about 1,200 tons of crude oil have been shipped daily from Hassi Messaoud, the richest deposit yet discovered, and within a decade France hopes to be self-sufficient in petroleum. The French public snapped up the few Saharan oil shares placed on the market in September 1957, and foreign companies now have joined in the oil rush. So far virtually all the development work and capital have been supplied by the French, but the government hopes that foreign interests will share in the huge expenditures required and also will become sufficiently committed financially so as to have a stake in the maintenance of French control of the desert. Only a few Frenchmen have opposed foreign participation.

Capital from the European common market countries, Britain and the United States has been attracted to the Sahara's mines, but not as yet

From the large American oil companies. What seems to be holding them back is not so much the huge sums involved—far larger than required for the Arabian oil fields—but uncertainty as to the future. Oil and ores may not be as plentiful as French optimists think, for the inventory of the Sahara's potential is far from complete; no appreciable quantities of either can be moved out so long as war persists in the coastal regions; and the terms on which profits are to be shared, operations controlled and output distributed await passage of legislation now under French official consideration.

Effects of Mineral Wealth

If the Sahara's mineral wealth has attracted the Western countries which have the capital and ability to aid in its development, it has also aroused the covetousness of impoverished and technically backward neighboring countries and of Algerian nationalists. Curiously enough, almost all the exploitable deposits so far are found in regions close to the OCRS's boundaries with Morocco and Libya. To export their output costly railroads must be built to non-French ports, except in the case of Mauritania's copper and iron ores, which will go to Port-Etienne. In November 1956 France reluctantly ratified a treaty with Libya calling for the withdrawal of the 450 French troops still in the Fezzan, which had been conquered by General Leclerc on his famous wartime cross-desert march to Bir Hakeim. This did not, however, prevent Libya, a member of the Arab League, from openly espousing the cause of Algeria's rebels and permitting them to use the country as a base for smuggling arms across the border and for attacks on French convoys provisioning south Saharan posts. And to the west, the Moroccan "army of liberation," in cooperation

with the National Liberation Front, (FLN) fanned dissidence among the local nomad tribes, hampered mining operations and pinned down many French troops throughout 1956.

France's Problems

Perhaps the most serious threat to the French has been the raids during 1957 by Moroccan irregulars to the north of Fort Gouraud's and Akjoujt's iron and copper mines in Mauritania from bases in Spanish territory. At the same time Allal el-Fassi, the Istiqlal-party leader, has sparked a fierce campaign for inclusion of Mauritania in "Greater Morocco," an aim to which he has won over a few Moorish leaders and some Reguëibat tribesmen. Thus far the Moorish government of Mauritania has stood firm against Allal's historical and legalistic arguments. On the other hand it has not yielded to French urging to join the OCRS and also seems disinclined to remain within the French West African federation. There is no doubt but that the Moors feel strong ties—cultural and especially religious—with Arab Morocco and also fear Senegal's "imperialistic designs" on the Negroes who make up a fourth of Mauritania's population. At the moment, the situation is not crucial, for a joint Franco-Spanish military operation in February 1958 inflicted a severe defeat on the Moroccan raiders and many Reguëibat tribesmen have now returned to the fold. Yet Mauritania's dilemma remains unsolved. It is basically the same though less acute than that of the three French Negro territories in French Equatorial Africa, whose Saharan regions are slated for inclusion in the OCRS. Thus far only Tchad has acquiesced, although the French cabinet minister, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who launched the OCRS is the leader of

French Negro Africa's strongest political party.

The fate of the Sahara will probably be settled in Paris and Algeria, and much depends on how the OCRS plays its role in the interval. As part of an over-all settlement in Algeria, the French government will doubtless have to sell the OCRS to its own people and to the Algerians; and it will be up to the OCRS to overcome by its performance the distrust felt now in the neighboring countries which it hopes will aid in carrying out its program. France is planning to invest 550 billion francs in the OCRS area during the coming five years. This will require a tremendous effort on the part of French taxpayers, even if aided by private capital, and they may balk at the cost. Assuming that the political situation in North Africa becomes stable, they can count on no returns before the mid-1960's. Even if the money is forthcoming, such a large-scale contribution probably will harden French intransigence toward Algerian aspirations. Moreover, the attitude of Algerian nationalists has also stiffened with each new proof of the wealth of "their" Sahara. Indeed, the Sahara is gradually becoming to many on both sides the main stake in the present conflict.

Projects Aid Agriculture

Big projects have been drawn up by the technical council of the OCRS to promote Saharan agriculture and animal husbandry by drilling and motorizing artesian wells, cloud-seeding, damming the Guir and creating an inland sea between Biskra and Touggourt. These and other accomplishments are urgently needed to raise the living standard of a population whose average annual per capita cash income was estimated in July 1958 to be only 4,000 frs. At the same time the OCRS is feverishly building

roads, enlarging the railroads' capacity, improving airfields, and the like.

Inevitably such activities produce more rapid and visible results than do the related human-welfare programs. But if the suspicions of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia that the OCRS is only disguised imperialism are to be allayed, the human-welfare projects must also be successfully promoted. Development of the Sahara's wealth primarily for the industrialization of North Africa would go far to solve that area's over-population problems and bolster its shaky economies. Either the Sahara will play a major part in showing the way out of the North African impasse, or it will become another apple of discord.

READING SUGGESTIONS: E. W. Bovill, *The Golden Trade of the Moors* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1958); R. Capot-Rey, *L'Afrique Blanche Française* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1953); R. Cartier, "Le Sahara," *Paris-Match*, March 22, 29, and April 5, 1958; P. Cornet, *Sahara, Terre De Demain* (Paris, Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1956); E. Gautier, *Le Sahara* (Paris, Payot, 1928); "Sahara, '58," *France Outre-Mer*, No. 342 (July 1958).

Spotlight

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regulations, which are of immediate importance to the advanced industrial nations; (3) pooling and coordination of reference and research, important to all nations, rich and poor, advanced and still underdeveloped.

The aid that the IAEA, which is intended to act as a bank for the flow

of materials and services between member states, can give is limited, so far, by the amounts of funds and fissionable materials placed at its disposal by its members. To give a few examples, the United States has contributed 500 kg. of contained uranium 235; Britain, 20 kg.; the U.S.S.R., 50 kg. The United States has promised special nuclear materials equal in quantity to the total of such materials supplied by other members, and on equivalent terms, up to July 1, 1960; and the U.S.S.R. is prepared to make available further supplies of fissionable and other materials. India has offered thorium necessary for atomic energy work carried out under the agency's auspices, the amount to be decided when the agency's requirements are known; Norway, isotopes produced in the reactor of Kjeller, operated in collaboration with the Netherlands, and special reactor materials such as aluminium and molybdenum; Canada, the amounts of natural uranium necessary for atomic-energy programs carried out with the participation of the agency for several years; and so on.

Peace for Atoms

The IAEA officials believe that one of the greatest contributions the agency can make is by providing an international channel for atomic aid to underdeveloped countries which,

according to its statute, it is pledged to do without discriminating in any way or imposing political, economic, military or other conditions. By sending international teams to ascertain local requirements in countries requesting atomic aid, the IAEA can assure the underdeveloped countries that their needs will be weighed on an impartial basis. And by pooling all available talents through cooperation in the training of scientists and in research, the IAEA could greatly accelerate the dissemination of up-to-date atomic information and skills throughout the world. While welcoming bilateral atomic arrangements worked out by the atomic Big Three with other countries, the IAEA points out the significance for the future of increased international exchanges, free of suspicions that attach to national aid.

By creating a focus for world cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the IAEA hopes that it may also contribute to the establishment of a world inspection system of nuclear explosions. This agency, which includes not only West and East but also the Vatican City and Switzerland (which do not belong to the UN) might then not only foster "atoms for peace" but also peace in which to make use of atoms for the benefit of all mankind.

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